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Has the China-Europe Freight Train 
Become a Winning Run?
CHINA AND THE WORLD
By Xiangming Chen
In “China and Europe: Reconnecting across a New Silk Road” (Xiangming Chen and Julie Mardeusz ’16, 
The European Financial Review, February/March 2015), we included a short section about the 
China-Europe Freight Train (CEFT). The CEFT was then in its fourth year of running, while the Belt 
and Road Initiative (BRI) was officially only two years old. A total of 815 freight trains ran between 
China and Europe in 2015. The pandemic year of 2020 saw 12,406 trains between China and Europe, 
with another surge during the first six months of 2021. What has changed over a few short years? 
This article addresses this question by examining the scope of the CEFT’s connectivity and its 
impact on both ends of a transcontinental rail freight system across Eurasia.     
"China and Europe: Reconnecting across a New Silk Road"
https://www.europeanfinancialreview.com/china-and-europe-reconnecting-across-a-new-silk-road/
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Imagine a local resident in the ancient Silk Road city of Xi’an in northwestern China en-joying fresh Atlantic salmon from Norway 
in the summer. This is possible now, thanks to 
the China-Europe Freight Train (CEFT)1, which 
began to ship salmon overland to China in 2020. 
Leaving Narvik, the northernmost cargo railway 
yard on the coast of the Norwegian Sea, a freight 
train carrying containers of salmon travels to 
Haparanda on Sweden’s border with Finland, 
where the containers are switched to Finnish 
wagons. From Kouvola, Finland, the salmon car-
go will cross into Russia and then follow the es-
tablished rail cargo route via St Petersburg and 
Moscow into Kazakhstan 
and eastbound, to arrive 
in Xi’an in about 10 days.2 
This freight connec-
tion from Arctic Norway 
to western China is only 
one line among a rapidly 
growing set of freight 
routes across Eurasia, the 
world’s oldest and longest 
route of overland trade 
connections, which once 
relied on camels and 
horses, dating back to the 
ancient Silk Road or even earlier. Fast-forward 
to the turn of the 20th century, British scholar 
Halford Mackinder saw the landmass of Eurasia 
as the pivot of global history and influence on 
geopolitical dynamics, at the central location 
of the planet (Chen and Fazilov 2018). He also 
foresaw trains covering this super-continent 
some day, although direct China-Europe freight 
services did not exist up to as recently as 2008 
(Hillman 2020). Over one short decade since 
2011, the CEFT has grown from 17 trains from 
China to Europe in 2011 to 7,377 trains heading 
in both directions in just the first six months of 
2021. Regarding Mackinder’s foresight, it has 
taken a whole century for the CEFT routes to 
(re)connect the Eurasian landscape for greater 
cross-border trade.
 
CONNECTING AND GROWING 
THROUGH A TRIO OF EURASIAN 
DYADS
When the inaugural CEFT opened up a single 
route from the megacity of Chongqing in 
southwestern China to Duisburg, Germany in 
2011, through Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus and 
Poland, few would have imagined or envisioned 
an extensive transcontinental network of freight 
lines criss-crossing the vast Eurasia today. 
These routes had carried 41,008 trains between 
over 50 Chinese cities and 168 cities across 23 
European and Asian coun-
tries by the middle of 
2021.3  Miraculous as it is, 
the geographical band of 
the CEFT signals straight, 
long-distance freight 
connections between 
China at the eastern end 
and Europe at the western 
end of Eurasia. The actual 
scope of these freight 
routes, however, has 
extended more broadly 
in an untidy and complex 
pattern. It has veered off the traditional Eurasian 
land bridge via Central Asia and the Trans-
Siberian Railway via Russia to include routes 
to and through Iran and Turkey. The CEFT has 
also created multi-modal and intermodal ship-
ping routes that stretch its connectivity to East 
Asia and Southeast Asia. These extended freight 
connections have turned the CEFT into a trio of 
dyadic transport/logistics ties between China-
Europe, Europe-Asia and China-Asia.
To assess the geographical and economic 
importance of freight lines between each of 
these three pairs, it is crucial to show the main 
contour of the CEFT network. Figure 1 displays 
the main CEFT corridors/channels, eastern, 
central and western. The eastern channel links 
cities in northeastern and eastern China to 
The geographical band of the CEFT 
signals straight, long-distance 
freight connections between China 
at the eastern end and Europe at 
the western end of Eurasia. The 
actual scope of these freight routes, 
however, has extended more broadly 
in an untidy and complex pattern. 
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Russia via the border city of Manzouli, north-
west of Harbin. The central channel connects 
some northern Chinese cities to Russia via the 
border city of Erlianhot, northwest of Beijing in 
Inner Mongolia. Both channels meet in Russia 
and travel on the Trans-Siberian Railway until 
arriving in Moscow, where some trains would 
join the western corridor into Europe. The 
eastern and central channels align with the 
China-Mongolia-Russia corridor of the BRI. 
The western corridor brings freight trains from 
many of China’s coastal and interior cities to 
Europe along the Eurasian Land Bridge from 
Lianyungang to Amsterdam, through the cities 
of Alashankou and Khorgos on the border with 
Kazakhstan. It parallels the BRI’s new Eurasian 
Land Bridge corridor. The western corridor 
spins off from the south channel, also called the 
“middle corridor”, which runs via Almaty along 
the BRI’s China-Central Asia-West Asia corridor 
(Figure 1).
The western corridor has encompassed the 
largest number of specific routes and freight 
trains, as shown by the most recent evidence. 
In the first half of 2021, the western, central 
and eastern channels sent 3,810, 1,285 and 2,282 
trains, which accounted for 51.6%, 17.4% and 
30.9% of all CEFTs over that period, respectively. 
From a spatial matching perspective, the CEFT 
and the BRI have converged, with the former 
driving the latter to help keep trade flowing 
between China and Europe. In addition, these 
train runs and trade flows have covered main 
parts of Central and West Asia (see Figure 1). Not 
shown on this map are extended connections 
to East Asia and Southeast Asia, which suggests 
that other parts of Asia are now tied into the 
CEFT system.
To get a more detailed picture of the freight 
connections between China-Europe, China-Asia 
and Europe-Asia in the tripartite CEFT system, 
Figure 2 organises the regions and cities that 
send and receive CEFTs through multiple inter-
national boundaries between China’s coast and 
Europe’s Atlantic coast. From east to west, corre-
sponding to the rough geographical layout of 
a partial world map, zones 1 to 4 identify four 
connected regions with subregions that contain 
the departure, intermediate and arrival places 
for a variety of CEFT routes, and the general 
economic features and activities creating and 
sustaining these routes (see the bottom row of 
FIGURE 1: THE CHINA-EUROPE FREIGHT TRAIN’S TRAVEL CORRIDORS/CHANNELS
Source: https://www.winskyfreight.com/rail-freight-china-to-europe/.
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Figure 2). While zone 1 includes three subzones 
of China’s earlier and more opened and devel-
oped coastal cities, zone 2 refers to three interior 
and border regions that have become the most 
active and dominant drivers of CEFTs as late 
developers and beneficiaries of China’s “Go 
West” campaign. Zone 3 consists of three parts 
of Asia, by land primarily and sea partially, that 
serve as transit zones or final or trans-shipped 
destinations. Zone 4 covers three regions further 
west, featuring Europe anchoring the other 
end of the CEFT system opposite zone 2. It also 
includes few West Asian cities, such as Istanbul, 
along the less-travelled south channel or middle 
corridor (see Figure 1), with North Africa (4C) 
much less connected to China by land.
While Figure 2 can reveal and mask numerous 
bilateral and trilateral freight routes between 
China, Europe and Asia, I use it to highlight 
two examples that illustrate the ever-expanding 
and extending long lines across a diverse set of 
national and subnational areas, with elaborations 
in the last section. On 18 August 2020, a freight 
train carrying electronic products, consumer 
goods and PPEs left the Chinese city of Shenzhen 
(subzone 1C, which also refers to the Pearl River 
Delta) bordering Hong Kong for Duisburg (see 
photo, figure 3). It travelled through 27 other 
Chinese cities, including Chengdu (2C), exited at 
Alashankou (2A) on 23 August, passed through 
Kazakhstan (3A), and finally arrived in Duisburg 
(4A) 11 days later, after a journey of 13,438 kilo-
metres.4 Sponsored by the China Merchants 
Group (CMG), headquartered in Hong Kong, and 
labelled “The Great Bay Express”, this service 
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manufacturing region in 2020. This is the second-longest 
CEFT line, slightly shorter than the Yiwu-Madrid (1B-4A) 
route, covering roughly 13,500 kilometres (Chen 2018). 
The second exemplary route returns a freight train from 
Europe (4A) through Kazakhstan (3A) to Chongqing (2C), 
which on 16 March 2018 sent 
the first train south to Hanoi, 
Vietnam (3C) via the Chinese 
border city of Pingxiang, 
Guangxi Province. This rail-
rail route, which reduces 
transport costs by one-third 
over shipping by sea, also 
extends south to the Chinese 
port city of Beihai, Guangxi 
Province, from where the 
cargo can be shipped to 
Singapore (also 3C) via 
rail-sea intermodal shipping. The China-Southeast Asia 
extended segment of this long route roughly aligns with 
the China-Indochina Peninsular Corridor of the BRI. 
These two exemplary routes reveal the crucial inter-
mediary role of key CEFT hubs in central and western 
China (2B and 2C) in linking a number of China’s coastal 
export-oriented centres (zone 1) to a large number of 
cities in Central Asia and Europe (3A and 4A). The spatial 
pattern within China is logically consistent with China’s 
goal of shifting development priority and opportunities 
from the coastal to the inte-
rior regions, especially the 
western region. The CEFT 
has created a geographically 
and functionally favourable 
opportunity for such north-
western and southwestern 
cities as Xi’an and Chengdu 
to catch up in development 
by prioritising transport 
logistics. This has further 
benefited these major inte-
rior cities by allowing them to 
shift from “going east” to attract cargo from export-heavy 
coastal cities to “going west” by sending exports to Europe 
by the CEFT more cost-effectively.
Figure 2 also points to the critical role of four small 
Chinese border cities, Alashankou and Khorgos (Xinjiang) 
FIGURE 3: THE FIRST “GREAT BAY EXPRESS” FREIGHT TRAIN FROM SHENZHEN ARRIVED IN DUISBURG ON SEPTEMBER 4, 2020
The CEFT has created a 
geographically and functionally 
favourable opportunity for such 
northwestern and southwestern 
cities as Xi’an and Chengdu to 
catch up in development by 
prioritising transport logistics.
Source: China Merchants Group photo; accessed from https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/8BldmufNSlQGmV61QFPBcw.
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and Erlianhot and Manzhouli (Inner Mongolia), 
as exit/entry points that have turned a few 
marginally located places into important gate-
ways (2A) of the CEFT network. With the smallest 
population of the four at less than 30,000, 
Alashankou (Alataw 
Pass or Dzungarian 
Gate), on the border 
with Kazakhstan, led all 
four cities in processing 
19,841 freight trains up to 
23 May 2021 since seeing 
the very first train from 
Chongqing to Duisburg 
in 2011. Alashankou now 
links 22 CEFT lines from 
a variety of cities across 
China to many cities 
spread across 13 European and Central Asian 
countries. In the first half of 2021, 3,033 trains 
carrying 288,300 TEUs (twenty-foot equivalent 
unit) containers passed through Alashankou, 
representing 41.1% more trains and 48.6% more 
freight over the same period in 2020.5 The CEFT 
has turned Alashankou and the other three 
small border cities of China into new interna-
tional logistics hubs.
As the number and extent of these CEFT 
routes have multiplied, they have expanded the 
number of departure, intermediate and arrival 
points across the four zones and thus accelerated 
the growth of CEFTs. While there were only 17 
trips in 2011, the launch of the BRI in 2013 saw 80 
trips, which rose to 308 in 2014. The number of 
trains jumped to 6,363 in 2018, almost equalling 
the total number of trips for the previous seven 
years. While the COVID-19 outbreak in China at 
the beginning of 2020 slowed the CEFT’s strong 
growth through 2019, the quick suppression of 
the virus halted the temporary slowdown and 
accelerated growth through 2020. By year-end, 
the 12,406 CEFT trips were 6.3 times those of 2016 
and exceeded the record 2019 by 51%. The end of 
2020 saw the cumulative number of CEFT trips 
reach 33,600, which had carried almost three 
million TEUs of traded goods, worth $160 billion.6 
This accelerated growth occurred at some 
expense in terms of reduced air and sea shipping 
during the pandemic. During January-June 2021, 
7,377 CEFTs carried 707,000 TEUs, increases of 
43% and 52% over the same period in 2020.7  
As the CEFT has grown, it has run more 
balanced directionally. 
Prior to 2014, every train 
ran from China to Europe. 
But the return or back-
haul trips began to grow 
in 2016 and accounted 
for roughly one-third of 
all trips. Of the 3,673 trips 
in 2017, 1,225 (33.4%) 
trains went from Europe 
to China (Jakóbowski 
et al. 2018). In 2018, the 
2,690 eastbound trains 
equalled 73% of the 3,670 westbound trains (Tjia 
2020). To put it differently, the Europe-to-China 
trains accounted for 42% of all trips. By another 
metric, while 94% of the westbound trains were 
fully loaded in 2018, 71% of the eastbound trains 
carried a full load of containers. In 2019, east-
bound CEFT trains rose to 45% of the total in both 
directions.8 This indicated an effective end of 
the “one-way street” before 2014. Moreover, this 
more balanced pattern has fostered extensions 
beyond the China-Europe and China-Central 
Asia connections, as indicated by the second 
example above.
The CEFT’s wide connectivity and rapid 
growth has impacted the relative positions and 
roles of the cities involved in relation to the 
spatial dynamics of production and consump-
tion across Eurasia. While some small and 
marginally located cities like Alashankou have 
become specialised in border-clearing logis-
tics, other second-tier or medium-sized cities 
have risen or revived to shape or redirect the 
geographical configuration and intersection of 
manufacturing supply chains and consumer 
goods flows within and across Europe and China, 
with important local consequences. I illustrate 
this cross-boundary impact of the CEFT using 
the ancient Chinese city of Xi’an and the historic 
river port of Duisburg, from their respective 
As the number and extent of these 
CEFT routes have multiplied, they 
have expanded the number of 
departure, intermediate and arrival 
points across the four zones and thus 
accelerated the growth of CEFTs.
CHINA AND THE WORLD
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locations and in long-distance connection to 
some other cities across Eurasia (Figure 2).
REDIRECTING PRODUCTION AND 
CONSUMPTION: XI’AN
The eastern starting point of the ancient Silk 
Road, Xi’an in Shaanxi Province, has been a 
prominent historical, cultural and economic 
centre in China for over two millennia. It served 
as the capital for 13 dynasties. While much 
better known for the Terracotta Soldiers than 
its economic prowess, Xi’an became one of the 
earliest cities in the world during the Han dynasty 
(206 BC–220 AD) and Tang dynasty (618-907 AD), 
the early and peak periods of the Silk Road. 
Fast-forward to the contemporary era, Xi’an fell 
behind its historic peers, such as Hangzhou and 
Nanjing in the coastal region, and lagged further 
behind coastal powerhouses like Shanghai and 
Shenzhen. Shenzhen benefited particularly 
from being the major destination for people and 
companies that had left inland cities like Xi’an 
in the 1980s. Xi’an has regained some of its lost 
fortune since around 2000, after China’s “Go 
West” policy and later the BRI. This favourable 
turn for Xi’an, and other central and western 
cities, positioned them well to use the CEFT as a 
logistics strategy for catch-up development.
Xi’an’s logistics strategy began with the 
construction of the Xi'an International Trade 
and Logistics Park (ITLP) in 2008. The ITLP 
comprised three integrated zonal functions: 
1) the Xi’an Comprehensive Bonded Zone; 2) 
the Xi’an rail container centre; and 3) the Xi’an 
inland road port. In 2009, the ITLP established 
and financed the Xi'an International Inland Port 
Investment & Development Group (ITL Group) 
as the ITLP’s operating arm. The ITL Group 
launched the first train to Almaty, Kazakhstan 
in 2013. From the outset, Xi’an idealised its 
CEFT with a reimagination of its ancient Silk 
Road position by invoking the metaphor of the 
“Iron Silk Road”. The Xi’an government named 
its CEFT after the old city name of “Chang’an 
(Forever Peace) Express”, which was used for the 
FIGURE 4: THE CHINA-EUROPE FREIGHT TRAIN “CHANG’AN EXPRESS” (XI’AN): THE CORPORATE IMAGE AND LOGO
Source: The China-Europe Freight Train “Chang’an Express” WeChat platform;
accessed from https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/ie84R92W5hns3s4p_VJ0YA.
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capital of several Chinese dynasties until it was renamed 
Xi’an (Western Peace) in 1369. The “Chang’an Express” 
also uses a fitting logo of three Bactrian camels walking 
next to a speeding train (see image, figure 4). Riding on the 
“Chang’an Express”, Xi’an rose to be a top-tier CEFT city in 
a few short years. In 2020, 3,670 CEFTs left and returned to 
Xi’an, ahead of Chengdu (2,800) and Chongqing (2,177) as 
the second- and third-ranked cities (Figure 2), accounting 
for almost one-third of China’s total number of CEFTs.9 
Xi’an has reconfigured some transnational flows of 
trade and production through its newly established logis-
tics role. In September 2019, the ITL Group dispatched the 
first “LG block train”, which carried exclusive liquid-crystal 
display (LCD) panels and electrodes to the factory owned 
by the large Korean manufacturer located in the Polish 
city of Sławków. Instead of around 40 days by sea, these 
containerised parts on a dedicated freight train arrived at 
the destination in 10-12 days. Since 2019, LG has already 
sent over 1,000 TEUs of parts to its factory in Sławków on 
the “Chang’an Express”, after shipping them from Korea 
to the Chinese port city of Qingdao and then to Xi’an for 
Europe.10 Via this logistical path from 1A->2B->2A->3A->4A 
(see Figure 2), which saves time and cost for LG, Xi’an has 
effectively redirected a global supply chain from East Asia 
via western China to central Europe.
Xi’an’s other logistical effect on production is more 
direct, as its transnational freight connectivity has lured 
more manufacturing companies to (re)locate locally in 
order to ship products and parts to European markets more 
quickly and cheaply. In 2018, the founder of Siying, an elec-
tronics manufacturing company in Shenzhen, originally 
from Xi’an, moved his entire factory back to his home town 
after realising that he could ship products to Central Asia 
faster (from around 40 to around 15 days) to lower costs and 
thus expand production. Since relocation, this company 
has reduced the cycle of its order placement and supply 
chain coordination from around 90 to 30-40 days, almost 
tripled its output, hired more local workers, and expanded 
its markets from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to France and 
Germany. This relocation of manufacturing production 
and faster shipping has involved a spatial movement of 
1C->2B->2A->3A->4A (Figure 2). 
FIGURE 5: VOLVO XC90 SUVS AND V40 HATCHBACKS ARRIVED AT XI'AN PORT FROM GHENT, BELGIUM ON JUNE 13, 2018
Source: China Daily photo;
accessed from https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201806/15/WS5b2387b9a310010f8f59d39f.html.
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Along with its impact on production, the 
“Chang’an Express” has strengthened Xi’an’s 
role in connecting and redistributing consump-
tion across European and Chinese cities. For 
example, Volvo has benefited greatly from 
running a new regular train between Xi’an and 
Ghent, Belgium. In June 2018, a CEFT train 
departed from Ghent and arrived at Xi'an Vehicle 
Port with 160 European-made Volvo XC90 SUVs 
and V40 hatchbacks, after 16 days (see photo, 
figure 5). These more expensive models sell 
very well in China, the world’s largest market for 
Volvo cars. In 2019, a “Chang’an Express” train 
loaded with 160 XC60 SUVs arrived in Ghent, 
Belgium after an 18-day journey. Made at Volvo's 
plant in Chengdu, China, the XC60 were sold in 
25 European countries, including France and 
Germany.11 During the first three months of 
2020, when China was seeing off the pandemic, 
27 trains from Xi’an carried 3,377 XC60s (aver-
aging 125 cars per block train) to the European 
markets through a fast and secure system from 
truck to train, without exposing the new cars 
to potential virus contamination (see photo, 
figure 6).12 While involving Central Asia only as 
the pass-through space, this bidirectional trans-
portation and consumption of Volvo cars flows 
through zones 1-4 (Figure 2). 
From its geometrical central location in 
China, Xi’an has channelled imported consumer 
goods within and beyond China. In 2020, more 
than 20 provinces, with uneven access to over-
land exports, used the “Chang’an Express” to 
export and import their goods by means of 
consolidation and redistribution via Xi’an. More 
than half of the imported goods for Shaanxi 
province passed through Xi’an, which also 
moved over 70% of these goods to the rest of 
China.13 The “Chang’an Express” has brought 
such popular European imports as Dutch dairy 
products, French cosmetics, Georgian red 
wine, Italian clothing and Norwegian salmon 
to Chinese consumers. As China has become 
an even bigger consumer, whose share of global 
consumption rose from 9% during 2000-5 to 23% 
during 2013-18 (McKinsey & Company 2021), 
Chinese consumers have been buying more 
imported consumer goods, especially luxury 
FIGURE 6: A FREIGHT TRAIN LOADED WITH XC 60 SUVS ARRIVED IN GHENT, BELGIUM FROM XI’AN ON JULY 4, 2019
Xi’an’s other logistical effect on 
production is more direct, as its 
transnational freight connectivity has 
lured more manufacturing companies 
to (re)locate locally in order to ship 
products and parts to European 
markets more quickly and cheaply.
Source: China Daily photo; accessed from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201907/08/WS5d22d625a3105895c2e7c40f_2.html.
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European brands, with over half of this spending 
from second- or lower-tier interior cities, led by 
cities like Xi’an.14 This bodes well for Xi’an to 
continue its role in stimulating local consump-
tion and spreading national consumption of 
global imports carried by its “Chang’an Express”.
RENEWING URBAN 
DEVELOPMENT: DUISBURG
While Xi’an is a good example of reviving itself 
through building up the ITLP and operating the 
“Chang’an Express”, I turn to Duisburg as a more 
compelling case where a deindustrialised city 
has renewed itself as Europe’s most important 
logistics hub for the CEFT. 
As the world’s largest inland port, at the inter-
section of the Rhine and Ruhr rivers in central 
Germany, Duisburg has a strategic locational 
advantage in receiving freight trains from China 
and trans-shipping their cargo to other parts of 
Europe by river, highway and rail. A river port 
for over three centuries (since 1716) and once a 
dominant coal-mining and steel-making centre 
in Germany’s industrial heartland of the Ruhr 
region, Duisburg has lost much of its manufac-
turing base since the 1960s with a weak economy 
and high unemployment, which stood at 11% 
compared with the average unemployment of 
3% across Germany.15 In 1982, Duisburg became 
a sister city to the Chinese city of Wuhan, 
although it had not done very much with China 
before 2011. Wuhan is similar to Duisburg 
economically, as a steel-making centre on the 
Yangtze River and also a CEFT hub today, similar 
to Xi’an (see Figures 1 and 2). The 1980s also 
saw Duisburg build up its inland port facilities. 
In 1993, Duisburg combined the harbours of 
Duisburg and Ruhrort and created the modern 
logistics hub of Duisport, although it continued 
to suffer from a broader decline due to industrial 
restructuring in the Ruhr region and Germany 
as a whole. This suppressed Duisburg’s build-up 
and greater logistics capacities, leading to two 
decades of “relative stagnation” until 2011,16 
when it began to receive a growing number of 
CEFTs from China.
Duisburg now receives four out of five trains 
every day from China as their first European 
stop, averaging about 35-40 arrivals each week. 
FIGURE 7: THE HISTORIC ENTREPÔT RIVER PORT WITH RAILWAY/ROAD 
(AUTOBAHNS) CONNECTIONS ON THE RHINE RIVER, DUISBURG, GERMANY
CHINA AND THE WORLD
Source: Taken by author in July, 2016.
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This large freight cargo flow into Duisburg has 
produced an agglomerated effect through the 
expanded and clustered activities in customs 
clearance, bonded warehousing, loading and 
other areas of intermodal trans-shipping at and 
from the river and rail terminals (see photo, 
figure 7). Duisport’s CEO noted that its employ-
ment has grown from 19,000 to 50,000.17 This 
has also created new opportunities for more 
Chinese companies, numbering over 100, to set 
up shop in Duisburg, which in turn contributes 
further to the local economy. It is estimated 
that the combination of the CEFT cargo and 
other Chinese investment account for about 
15% of Duisburg’s employment. The infusion of 
Chinese goods, capital and personnel has turned 
Duisburg from a traditional river port for local 
trade into a more expansive continental logistics 
centre capable of diffusing economic influence 
across Central and Eastern Europe through the 
multimodal distribution of cargo flows.18 
Besides the measurable economic impact 
in Duisburg, the city’s growing ties with China 
through and beyond the CEFT have brought 
about other positive local changes. About 
2,000 Chinese students currently study at the 
University of Duisburg-Essen. Max Planck 
High School in Duisburg has become a leader 
in teaching Chinese. “The trend is clear: we 
must work together with China,” said principal 
Gabriele Rüken. To that end, she decided that as 
of 2020, students at her school would be able to 
start learning Chinese from their seventh year, 
alongside French and English. This educational 
initiative can help Germans better understand 
China and be prepared to deal with this global 
economic power with a long reach.19 On 14 April 
2020, the first train for Europe from Wuhan 
arrived in Duisburg with large amounts of PPE, 
which reinforced the long-standing, long-dis-
tance sister-city relationship between the two 
cities. Now known as Germany’s “China City”, 
Duisburg has not only largely revived its eroded 
economy by becoming Europe’s central CEFT 
hub, but also created a broader foundation for 
more sustainable development and prosperity 
through logistical multipliers.  
FROM CONNECTIVITY TO 
SUSTAINABILITY
Looking out from Xi’an and Duisburg as 
main CEFT hubs, the CEFT’s ever-expanding 
trans-border spaces (Figure 2) appear to be 
geographically confined and finite due to a 
variety of economic, spatial and market condi-
tions, such as basic demand and passable 
topography, etc. The actual scope and edge of 
the CEFT’s connectivity, however, have been 
pushed further out toward unfamiliar territo-
ries and through more complicated intermodal 
extensions. This alerts us to consider where the 
most recent CEFT routes may lead and the addi-
tional actors and places involved.
On 24 July 2020, a freight train left Xi’an, 
travelling north via Erlianhot into Mongolia, 
through Russia and Minsk, Belarus, and then 
ran south past the town of Mostyska near the 
Ukrainian-Polish border, before arriving in 
Kiev. This became possible through cooperation 
between the Polish logistics company PCC and 
the Ukrainian company Global Ocean Link. They 
took advantage of the CEFT’s rapid expansion and 
Ukraine as the EU’s largest trading partner, with 
their bilateral trade having grown 10-15% during 
2014-19.20 On 28 June 2021, the first-ever freight 
train travelled from Xi’an through Kazakhstan, 
Russia, Poland and Germany, before arriving in 
As the world’s largest inland port, 
at the intersection of the Rhine 
and Ruhr rivers in central Germany, 
Duisburg has a strategic locational 
advantage in receiving freight 
trains from China and trans-
shipping their cargo to other parts 
of Europe by river, highway and rail. 
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Paris after 18 days. From Paris, some cargo was 
transported to the port of Marseilles, and then 
shipped to Algeria, Morocco and Tunis by sea 
(2B->2A->3A->4A->4C). This is faster than going 
through Duisburg and then to either Hamburg 
by water or any of the Mediterranean ports by 
truck for shipping to North Africa, reaching the 
edge of the CEFT’s conventional boundaries 
(Figure 2) via intermodal trans-shipment. 
In November 2019, a “Chang’an Express” train 
left Xi’an, went through Kazakhstan and Baku, 
Azerbaijan across the Caspian Sea, passed the 
Georgian capital of Tbilisi and then the Turkish 
capital of Ankara, through the Marmaray 
tunnel below the Bosphorus Strait in Istanbul, 
and eventually arrived in Prague. It marked a 
rare land-sea-land intermodal run along the 
CEFT’s south channel or middle corridor (see 
Figure 1). This new line gained more use in 
early 2021, when the inaugural return train 
from Istanbul arrived in Xi’an after 15 days and 
thus launched the bidirectional Xi’an-Istanbul 
service (2B<->2A<->3A<->4B). Back in August 
2016, Jiangsu Qingeng Industrial Co. and 
companies from Afghanistan jointly launched a 
freight train from the city of Nantong (Jiangsu 
Province), near Shanghai, to Afghanistan. The 
trip took 15 days to complete and passed through 
Alashankou, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan before 
arriving at the land border port of Hairatan 
(Mazar-i-Sharif ) in northern Afghanistan.21 A 
freight train returned along the same route in 
2019 (see photo, figure 8). A rare China-Asia 
freight connection (1B<->2A<->3A<->3B), this 
difficult route to a risky destination heralds a 
potential new opportunity for China to engage 
with Afghanistan economically and logistically 
with the departure of the United States military.
As the CEFT connects more cities over 
wider geographies and longer distances, it has 
involved more diverse and competing players, 
most of which are local municipal governments, 
their subordinate entities and private logistics 
firms (see above), as well as their partnerships. 
FIGURE 8: A TRAIN LOADED WITH AFGHAN GOODS HEADS TO NANTONG, CHINA IN SEPTEMBER, 2019
Source: https://www.railfreight.com/beltandroad 
/2019/09/17/afghan-train-to-china-is-a-fact.
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The ITL Group worked with DHL in November 
2019 to launch the “German Express” from Xi’an 
to Hamburg and Neuss, another logistics hub on 
the Rhine river, like Duisburg. The ITL Group 
has also cooperated with Deutsche Bahn (DB) 
in using the “German Express” to add a service 
to Vilnius, Lithuania. In 
March 2019, the ITL Group 
got Nippon Express, a top 
global logistics firm from 
Japan, to lure its clients 
like Olympus and Honda 
to use the “Chang’an 
Express” for shipping 
their exports from Xi’an 
to Europe (1A->2B->2A-
>3A->4A, Figure 2). This goes along with Xi’an’s 
greater role in adding air and sea extensions, 
which accounted for 40% of the “Chang’an 
Express’s” new business during the initial peak 
of the pandemic in early 2020.  
From the European end, for example, the ÖBB 
Rail Cargo Group (RCG), a leading rail logistics 
company in Austria, entered the CEFT market 
in 2017, when it operated only 62 trains with a 
transport capacity of 3,000 TEUs. Due to stronger 
demand, RCG transported 35,000 TEUs between 
Europe and Asia in both 2018 and 2019. In 2020, 
it set a new record of over 700 trains with around 
70,000 TEUs.23 As one of the EU’s only four land-
locked countries, Austria stands to benefit from 
a stronger connection to the CEFT driven by RCG 
and its strong focus on creating and connecting 
the Eurasian freight routes through Russia.
Through the growing participation via both 
competition and collaboration between private 
and public logistics companies from Europe, 
China and East Asia, the CEFT has introduced 
more market efficiency into this vast cross-
border logistics system. The CEFT-led initiatives 
by cities like Xi’an and Duisburg have driven the 
larger number of freight lines from below. To 
sustain the CEFT for the long run, the private 
sector and local government need to interface 
with the national governments and even suprana-
tional agencies of China, Europe and Asia more 
broadly. In July 2020, the most top-heavy national 
government of China issued a plan to consolidate 
the CEFT hub functions in five major cities, Xi’an, 
Chengdu, Chongqing, Urumqi, and Zhengzhou 
(Henan Province), which accounted for 63% 
of all CEFTs in the first half of 2021. This was a 
corrective measure to reduce the inefficiency 
cause by over-competition 
and duplication among 
many cities. It reflects the 
national government’s 
effort to catch up with local 
authorities and actors in 
developing and operating 
the CEFT by introducing 
a national vision and form 
of support. This is further 
exemplified by the national government’s require-
ment that subnational governments’ subsidies, 
including by Xi’an, for CEFT cargo trains should 
not exceed 50% of domestic railway costs and be 
reduced by 10% a year compared to the 50% level 
in 2018, with the prospect that all subsidies will 
be phased out by 2022.24 
From the more collective and fragmented 
European end, the EU’s two-decade-old Trans-
European Transport Network (TEN-T), which 
includes hundreds of air, rail, road and port 
projects to strengthen the cohesion, interconnec-
tion and interoperability of the trans-European 
transport network by 2030, appears to dovetail 
with the CEFT and the BRI. In reality, however, 
the TEN-T and the CEFT have not formally “met” 
through any direct dialogue and cooperation. 
In another complication, it is unclear how the 
CEFT will interact with the EU’s “Connecting 
Europe and Asia – Building blocks for an EU” 
strategy, introduced in September 2018. A new 
challenge to coordinate with the CEFT comes 
from the most recent EU initiative – “Globally 
Connected Europe” -- which seems designed 
to counter the BRI, and by extension the CEFT, 
by coordinating and promoting investments in 
infrastructure projects to link Europe with the 
world from 2022. At the national level, however, 
Germany has more of its cities involved with 
the CEFT than any other EU member state, also 
evidenced by its discharging the second-largest 
The CEFT’s expansion and 
sustainability will benefit from being 
the critical middle option of long-
distance freight transport that is 
faster than sea and cheaper than air.
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number of TEUs from East Asia, including by sea, behind 
only Britain before it left the EU. It isn’t just coincidence 
that the departing German Chancellor Merkel has consist-
ently taken the most pro-China stance among the major EU 
members, and also relative to the United States.
Finally, the CEFT faces a greater challenge in raising 
its share of carrying the China-EU trade cargo, especially 
against the dominant sea shipping. In 2018, the CEFT 
accounted for only 2.3% of China’s exports to Europe and 
3.1% of China’s imports from Europe, while about 90% of 
China-Europe trade by weight and 60% by value went by sea 
(Tjia 2020). Aided by a shift of maritime cargo to overland 
rail shipping due to the pandemic, the share in Europe’s 
total imports from China by train rose from <1% in 2011 to 
4% in 2020. The EU-China trade volume on rail more than 
doubled, with annual growth of 26.9% from 2016 to 2020.25 
Yet the 1,135,000 TEUs carried by the CEFTs in 2020 only 
equalled 2.6% of all the TEUs handled by Shanghai Port,26 
which is not surprising given the structural cost and scale 
advantages of sea shipping. 
As trade continues to grow between China and the 
EU, as each other’s largest and second-largest trading 
partners respectively, the CEFT is poised to grow with it. 
This looks more promising as the CEFT consolidates its 
recently launched routes into round trips and to regular 
schedules, such as the new Xi’an-Istanbul line and a new 
Xi’an-Budapest line via Ukraine. It will help translate the 
CEFT-related dots and lines on the Eurasian transport 
map into a more formal and resilient network carrying 
a steadily growing share of the China-Europe and China-
Central Asia trade cargo. The CEFT’s expansion and 
sustainability will benefit from being the critical middle 
option of long-distance freight transport that is faster 
than sea and cheaper than air. This bodes well for the 
CEFT to run not only more connected across Eurasia but 
also more sustainably into the future. 
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